vertebrate midbrain is sufficient for subjective experience. In fact, Barron and Klein's conclusions (1) about the capacity of the midbrain are primarily based on anecdotal reports that some anencephalic individuals respond to sensory stimulation, observations that failed to distinguish nonconscious from conscious responses. They also contend that subcortical regions must be responsible for awareness because some cortical lesions do not produce defects in subjective experience. This conclusion is unsupported because there are many reports of selective cortical lesions producing abnormal subjective experience. For instance, lesions to the primary visual cortex are well known to cause blindness (i.e., loss of the subjective experience of imagery). These weaknesses in the premises underlying Barron and Klein's hypothesis have been discussed in detail elsewhere (2-4).
Finally, Barron and Klein (1) believe that because insects display selective attention to visual stimuli (or produce upstream neural representations of sensory information), they must be sentient. However, neither selective attention nor neural representations are necessarily indicative of subjective experience (5), a point Barron and Klein (1) acknowledge. Thus, they fail to make a convincing case that insects can tell us anything about subjective experience or consciousness.
